

THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY MOVEMENT SINCE THE BREAK-UP OF THE SOVIET UNION IN 1999

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ABSTRACT

After the breaking up of the former Soviet Union, Russia found itself losing its regional and international roles, especially when the N.A.T.O extended to east Europe. As a reaction to this situation, Russian Federation decided, when Mr. Vladimir Putin took office in 1999, to re-establish control over positions and geographical regions of strategic importance, which were under the sphere of the former Soviet-Union.

Through those regions, the energy, which is the backbone of the Russian economy, was transferred to Europe by pipelines., therefore Russian Federation didn't hesitate to take control of regions like Georgia and Ukraine. Moreover Russia maintained a military presence in Syria to guaranty the operations of its military bases in Tartus port and prove that it is a major player facing the American influence in the middle east region.

Key Words: Russia intervention, energy, pipelines, Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, crisis

INTRODUCTION

The political geography is one of most important elements of analyzing the policy of any state and one of the most important determinants of its political decision at the internal and external levels. The factor of the political geography keeps the continuity of the policies of any state, although its regime has been changed as the determinants of the political geography depend on elements which are very stable. This situation is clearly linked to the Russian case, where the political geography forced Russia to keep conducting certain policies across its different historical periods. (1)

Accordingly, if any super power has its own " geo-strategy" premises" that can never be forfeited, Russia also has, after the breaking up of the soviet union, its premises which fall within what is called the " immediate geographical circle" of Russia which extend from

Georgia, Ukraine, through Czech Republic, and Poland until the borders of the Baltic Sea countries.

The East region of Europe is a very vital and important area for the Russian Federation because it represents not only the first line of defense against any aggression from West Europe but also the buffer zone which prevents any conflicts that might happen in central Europe and the Balkan between different, ethnic religious and national groups. Always, in this " immediate geographical circle" the sparking wars were breaking out and extending to Europe, tsarist and soviet Russia. (2)

1- Revenge of geography, Ronert D. kablan. Translated Ihab Abdulrahem Ali. The world knowledge, The National Council of Cultural, Art and Litterateur. P195 Kuwait.

2- Wessame Kalajia. Eurasian Russia in the era of Putin. Arab Sciences House. Biuret Lebanon 2017, p. 166.

The Western borders with Europe are still the greatest threat to the security of the Russian Federation. The northern European prairie, that extends from the borders of the Baltic Sea countries in the North to the Carpathian-Mountains in-

Romania in the South, where the natural barriers do not exist, reflects painful events in the historical memory of Russia. The clearest example of this is the European invasions on Russian soil that were conducted consistently, across the history via the Czech and the Polish territories.

Russian Federation geographical circle covers an area of 17 million square kilometers. It is nearly the area of the United States and China together. The time difference between the eastern and the western parts of the country stands at nearly nine hours. This huge area imposed on Russian Federation a political reality, that it is a country which can not control its border. Therefore, the best means to guarantee its defense across the history was to expand geographically, military, and politically beyond its borders. (3)

Regarding the geography, Russia faces another problem: in spite of its huge area, it hasn't any open access to the high seas. From the west, St Petersburg and Kaliningrad cities overlook on the Baltic sea that is separated from the North sea by Oresund strait, moreover Germany and United Kingdom overlook the North sea that is another obstacle depriving Russian Federation from reaching the Atlantic Ocean. From the south, Russian Federation ports overlook the black sea which is separated from the Mediterranean by Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits in Turkey. (4) In general, Russian Federation experiences suffering from being denied access to the warm water all the year. Vladivostok city, the Russian most important port on the sea of Japan and the Pacific Ocean is near the polar orbit, hence the Russian Federation has worked recently on soliciting Greek Cypriot and Malta to be her potential ports on the Mediterranean

3- Karar Abass Mutaab. Al-Massoudy. The Russian Strategy towards The region of Caucasia. (Georgia as an example) PHD theses. College of Political sciences, Al-Nahrain University. Baghdad 2016. P 43.

4- Philip Seep-Lopez. Political Geography of Petrol. Translated by Dr. Najat AL-Soulaybe Al-Tauil. Abudabi. Comity of Cultural and Tourism 202 first edition. P202

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After the breaking-up of the Soviet-Union, the withdrawal of the east European states from the Russian orbit, and the desire of some of them to join the N.A.T.O in spite of the Russia opposition, it was very hard for the Russian Federation to accept the existence of the N.A.T.O forces near its borders as this would threaten the Russian nuclear arsenal and weaken its capacity to carry out the second strike from the neighboring eastern Europe. (5) In light of this critical situation, we can understand why Russia insists on forbidding Ukraine and Georgia from joining the N.A.T.O and the absolute rejecting of the deployment of the American missile shield in Czech, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. This political behavior could be interpreted by the modification of the geographic dimensions of the Russian Federation which resulting in Russia's entry as a major player in the Syrian crisis

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5- Al-MashadanyMouhammedMuyasser. The future of the international geo-strategic balance in the world. Academic House Company 1st edition 2016,Aman, Jordan. Pp2017-2019.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF GEORGIA FOR RUSSIA

Before treating this subject, it would be useful to explain the importance of Georgia for the Russian federation. The

state of Georgia , which is locatedin the northern temperate zone between the latitudes (542-443) north and the longitudes(574-540) east , is the shortest land route connecting the states of Europe and those of central Asia .The state of Georgia is bounded on the north by the black sea with a maritime distance estimated at (309) kilometers including (200) kilometers as maritime boundary of the Abkhazian territory ; thus it has a distinguish strategic position that made Georgia a transit country for gaze and oilfrom the Caspian basin to the black sea and onward tothe European states and central Asia .. It is the point where east Europe and west Asia meet . Georgia surrounded by Russian federation from the north, Turkey from the south and Armenia from the southeast. (6)

6-Abdul Aziz Adil. Georgia and Its Relations With the Neighboring Countries. Cairo . Strategic Research Centre. 20008 P. 34



The transfer of Bako’s petrol through Georgia

Historically Georgia was annexed to Russia in 1801 in order to repulse the Persian and ottoman attacks and became a part of the tsarist Russia, which was broke down after the Bolshevik revelation in 1917. (7)

The Soviet- Union inherited the territories of the tsarist empire. The process of inheritance experienced several transformations such as insurgencies, eruptions and attempts of establishing more than state out of the borders of the soviet union in particular the declaration in 22th April 1918 of the (Democratic Federal Independent Republic Of Caucasus) which was consisted of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.. Soon thereafter these entities crushed and later were transformed into Soviet autonomy regions.(8)

7 – Mouayed Omer Abdulrahman. The International Position Towards The Georgian-Russian Conflict About Ossetia and Abkhazia regions. Institute of Foreign Services . Baghdad. Iraq 2010. P.98

. 8 – Al-Hamdany Najla Hamad Bidiaywe. The Stat of Georgia. A Studay in Political Geography. An M.A Theases . College Of Education For Girls . University Of Baghdad. 2017. P.36

GEORGIA AFTER THE SOVIET ERA

Georgia declared its independence from the Soviet-Union in 1991, then it faced separatist movements in Abkhazia and Ossetia that were fueled by internal and external factors. Ossetia is located in the middle of the Caucasus territory between the latitudes (42,39-42) north and the longitudes(44,35-43,30) east. It is divided between Russian Federation and the state of Georgia.

The two parts of Ossetia adopted *Terek* river to mark the northern and the southern borders between theme .Thus, Northern Ossetia is an autonomy republic within the Russian Federation while the Southern Ossetia is an autonomy region located in the middle of Georgia and separated from Northern Ossetia by a mountain chain. It declared itself republic by defacto authority, but it didn't obtain any recognition by the international community.

THE RUSSIAN ROLE IN THE OSSETIAN CONFLICT

Ossetia experienced during the past years many important changes in its legal status and sovereignty, sometimes it becomes an independent republic and other times it is divided in tow parts that are annexed, as autonomy regions to the neighboring states : Russian Federation and Georgia. After being joined to the Georgian society , the Ossetian people felt that their cultural identity was being melted ,therefor they claimed the separation from Georgia, the reunification of the two parts of Ossetia in order to declare theme an independent republic or as a partof the Russian Federation (9) When the influence of the ex-soviet union declined in 1989, south Ossetia called for the separation from Georgia. The former soviet union had to send military forces to maintain the security in the region after the outbreak of confrontations between the Georgians and Ossetians in the capital Tskhinvali .

9 –Deyab Ahmed. The Conflict in Caucasia : wrong calculations and dangerous regional repercussions. Journal Of International Politics. Volume 24 P. 213 Cairo 2008 .

The clashes between the two sides were repeated sporadically, until 1992 when an agreement for deploying peace keeping force composed of Georgian, Ossetian and Russain troops was held . The influence of the separatists declined when Edward Shevardnadze took office but during Mikael Sashkavily presidency who wanted to integrate the two parts of Ossetia in the state of Georgia thy demanded the separation from Georgia .(10)

In 2004, a confrontation between the Georgian forces and Ossetians gunmen took place , when the Georgian authorities tried to stop what they called illegal trading between south Ossetia and Russia. The confrontation ceased by regional and international meditation and with the assistance of the peace keeping Georgian, Ossetian, and Russian joined forces . . In October 2006 south Ossetia conducted a referendum which permitted it to reclaim independence and join the Russian Federation , whereas the parliament in Abkhazia region requested the recognition of the independence and thejoining of the United Nations.

That was followed by an official Russian statement indicating that Russia would recognizethe commercial

institutions and organizations in Ossetia and Abkhazia (3) . In April 2008 Russian Federation declared that it would establish legal relations with Abkhazia and Ossetia . This step outraged Georgia for it might result, in the future in Russia's recognition of the independence of the separated region(11) the change of the power elite in Georgia , the United States turned from human rights advocates to supporter of centralism of the country , while the Russians , along with the army supported the minorities' rights and the separated regions. This situation pushed the Georgian president Michael Sakshevilly to attack south Ossetia in August 2008 to submit south Ossetia to Georgia, but the Russian response was decisive.

10- Wathek Mohammed Al-Barak. The Russian-Georgian War. The Research Review Of The College of Education . University Of Mosul. Volume 9 . No.2 . 201 P.35

11- AsselHamza Al-Khanjer. The Russian –Georgian Relations After the Cold War. An M.A Unpublished Theses . College of the political Science . University of Baghdad 2001. P . 59.

The Russian army supported the southern Ossetians with weapons and helped them to expel the Georgian forces . During these rapid developments , south Ossetia declared its independence from Georgia on the 26th of August 2008 . Russian Federation recognized this independence and supported it.(5) , although it didn't obtain any international recognition (12)

EVENTS OF ABKHAZIA REGION

The formation of ethnic revolutionary guard in Abkhazia in 1990 was a cause for concern because it paved the way to the idea of independence which the Abkhazian parliament voted in the capital Sukhumi in the same year.

This vote was firmly rejected by the Georgian parliament in Tbilisi, nevertheless the Abkhazians insisted on proclaiming their independence from Georgia on August 1992 (8) , whereas the Georgian forces invaded the Abkhazian region and occupied the capital Sukhumi and some of the important coastal centers on the 14th of August 1992.

The Abkhazian forces were forced to fled North to the Russian borders where it received a strong support from

Russia and volunteers who came from the northern Caucasia, so the Georgian troops retreated . After several clashes on the Abkhazian territories, the firing stopped in July 1993 with the mediation of Russia on condition that the Georgian forces withdraw from Abkhazia and the two sides must be disarmed , .which means that Georgia had been defeated and Abkhazia was independent.(13) After the war period between 1992-1993 , Abkhazia declared itself a de facto independent state , but it didn't obtain the United Nations membership .The U.N is still urging the Abkhazian and the Georgian sides to solve their differences by peaceful means and to approve this text by the Georgian constitution

12- DiyarySallehMajeed and AlliaHasn Ali. The Abkhazian Problem: a study in the political geography. Review of Iraqi Geographic Association. College of Education Ibn Rushed. University Of Baghdad. Volume 21 no. 54 . 2008 P 43.


.13- JawadSandel . Russia and Georgia . Petrol and Geostrategic: un political geographic concept. Review Of The University Of Diyala No.41. 2004 P.25 P.25 Iraq.

The Russian military and political influence in Abkhazia is still strong. . Russia has been issuing passport to the Abkhazians citizens since 2000 because the Abkhazian passports are ineffective in the international flights for they are not recognized by the international flight authorities. . Russia pays also pensions and other financial benefits to the people of Abkhazia.. in 2006 more than 80% of the Abkhazian population obtained the Russian nationality, however they don't pay taxes to Russia nor serve in its army

The causes of the Georgian – Abkhazian conflict is due to the Russian role .The former soviet union adopted , during the Stalinist period, the policy of *divide and rule* in many soviet republics like Armenia , Azerbaijan and Chechnya to keep people struggling to let everyone feels the need the soviet –union 's power to secure his existence. . Russia pursued the same policy in dealing with the events that took place in Georgia. Therefore, it is impossible to solve the problem of Abkhazia without dialoguing with Russian Federation which describes its relation with Abkhazia as a strategic interest. (14)

14- Taleep Hassan Hafiz. The New variables In Russian policy towards Caucasia and central Asia . Review of the

college of education for girls. Volume 23. No.2 2012 P.450.



The position of the two parts of south Ossetia

THE IMPORTANCE OF UKRANIE

The Russian geopolitics orientations paid special attention to the republic of Ukraine, when it was independent from the former soviet union and tried to join the European Union. This attention mostly stems from the fact that Ukraine is located south west of the European part of the Russian Federation, and bounded by the republic of Belarus from the north , Russian federation from the east and north-east, the black sea and Azov sea from the south, the republics of Moldavia, Romania, and Hungary from south-east and by Slovakia and Poland from the west.

The Ukrainian’s politic , since it’s independence in 1991 had been ambiguous due to the domination of the political scene by two political currents : the extreme right and the extreme left. The first calls for the integration of the country in the European Union , while the second demands that Ukraine must be oriented towards Russia and the Commonwealth of independent states in order to strengthen Ukrainian sovereignty and obtain assistance . (15) The two currents struggled feverishly to win the

elections that were organized in 2004 as a part of so-called the orange revolution aiming the stability of the country and preventing the Russian intervention.

Mr. Jankovic , the leader of the extreme left won the elections after obtaining the majority of votes in two rounds . These elections were cancelled due to the American pressures and the appeal of the supreme court in Ukraine. The elections were re-established and Mr. Yushchenko- American and the leader of the extreme right won the elections and took power in 2005. Thereafter two crisis hit the country, the first was in 2010 ,after the separation between the main leaders of the orange revolution Victor Yushchenko and Julia Tymoshenko, the second was in 2013 when Madame Tymoshenko suspended the signature of the partnership agreement with the European Union.

15- Amina Muhammed Ali. The chances of Ukraine’s accession to the European Union. Review of international papers . no. 206 . pp 19-20 . International Studies Centre . University of Baghdad

When the Berlin wall fell in 1989, the Americans feared that Europe might be united with Russia and such union would threaten the United States and their position in the world, thus the states which are located between Russia and western Europe, (states of east Europe) became an issue of great strategic importance .

The United States considers Ukraine the most important states that must be joined to the N.A.T.O. pact for it has a geographic dimension which plays a significant role in the military confrontation between Russia and the pact. The U.S.A began to put pressures on the European Union in order to encourage Ukraine to join the European Union.(16) Therefore the U.S.A. urged the Ukrainian opposition to remove the president Victor Jankovic from power with a view to achieving their goal of elimination of the Russian military presence in Crimea characterized by the maritime fleet stationed in Sevastopol base.

THE INTERVENTION OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN UKRAINE

The fight for the territorial influence between the west and the Russian Federation which appeared in the gaze crisis between Russia and Ukraine resulted in cutting off the Russian gaze of Europe and Ukraine. This situation means that the fall of Ukraine in the embrace of the west reduces the Russian geopolitics choices in the region. The uprising which took place in Ukraine and resulted in establishing a pro-western regime represents a direct threat to Russian interests. Responding to this threat, the Russian federation annexed Crimea, but when it realized that this move didn't

put enough pressure on Ukraine to settle the Ukrainian crisis

16- Al-Fadhly Sabreen Abass Al-Kaaby. The Russian – Ukrainian relations after the cold war. An M.A unpublished thesis . college of political science . University of Baghdad 2011 P.32

Russia started to fuel uprising in the east of Ukraine against the Ukrainian government. On the 25th of April , a number of armed militia occupied the administrative and security buildings in about ten cities . Although the Russia denied any involvement in these operations , the available indications prove that the Russian Federation supported it through Russian influence in the those militia. For its part, the Ukrainian government couldn't remain inactive seeing that groups of armed militia challenge its authority in the east of the country and request a Russian military intervention in this region.(17)

Therefore , the Ukrainian army and the security forces fought those militia, and after recapturing specific areas from eastern Ukraine they found that it would be difficult to continue the fight due to the firm resistance of Russian civilians in the region. The Ukrainian army, instead of confronting these civilians that might result in committing massacre , decided to withdraw leaving behind some tanks and military equipment

17-Redha Muhammed Hilal. Ukraine . ; an angry autumn supports democracy. Review of democracy . no17. January p. 5



The transfer of energy by pipelines from Russia to Europe

THE SYRIAN CRISIS

The Syrian crisis began on March 2011 when demonstrations took place in Daraa governorate. On the 31st of July, it had a military character, when a number of Syrian officers defected the regular Syrian army and established what is called the *Syrian free army*. Political observers believe that the main cause of the uprising is to get rid of Bashar Al-Assad's regime which has been governing Syria for fifty years.

The persistence of the crisis opened the door wide to the external interventions. The royal petroleum states support the Syrian oppositions, while Iran sided with the Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad. (18) On the 15th of September 2011, the principle leaders of the opposition established, after a meeting held in Istanbul, The Syrian National Council, but those who were members of the Syrian National Council failed to create a strong front against the Syrian president because they didn't agree about the future of Syria. Regarding the Kurds, who represent 10% of the population and concentrated in the regions of Hasakeh, Qamishli, Copani and Efren, they took advantage of the Syrian crisis to reclaim a federal regime in Syria. Knowing

that some of the regional parties who are active in the Syrian scene consider the unities of the protection of the Kurdish people as the Syrian branch of the Turkish P/K/K.

RUSSIA : MAJOR PLAYER IN SYRIA CRISIS

In spite of the repercussions of the military operations of the powers conflict in Syria, the Syrian presented is still in power due to two factors, one is internal, the other is external. On the internal front, the leaders of the regime could overcome the shocks of the defections in the armed forces. On the external front, the Syrian president succeeded in setting up strong relations with some states like Russia and Iran, and political armed organizations like The Lebanese Hezbollah. These parties didn't hesitate

18- Alaa Salem. The repercussions of the external factors in the evolution of the Syrian Crisis Cairo. International Politic Review. no 188 April 2012 PP112-115

to support Bashar Al-Assad materially, military, politically, and diplomatically to enhance his resistance to the oppositions' forces. (19)

The regime of Bashar AL-Assad assisted by the direct intervention of Hezbollah, Iran, and Russia in the returned over the equilibria forces in the conflict with the oppositions' forces in his favor and took imitative. At the same time, Iran sent a number of experts who prepared and trained additional forces to back up the regular Syrian army.

Iran insists on confronting the American influence in Syria because it " belongs to the regional system of the Middle-East and to another sub-regional system that is the regional system of the Arab Gulf thus it became a regional dominant power defending the value which it believes in and trying to spread them in the regions as a mechanism for seeking power and influence within its regional scope" (20)

THE RUSSIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN SYRIA

In a significant development of the Russian position towards the regime of Bashar Al-Assad, the spokesman for the Kremlin announced that the Russian authorities were waiting a request from the Syrian leadership about the possibility of the participation of the Russian soldiers in the military operations against the terrorist organization ISIS and the discussing of this matter through bilateral contacts.

Responding to this suggestion, the Syrian minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Walid Al-Moualem announced on the 17th of August that his country would demand from Russia to dispatch forces to fight along with the Syrian government forces, if necessary, against the terrorism confirming that the cooperation between the Syrian and the Russian military forces is deeply strategic. He said "No one in the world can affect the ability of the Syrian decision" (21) Then Russia interfered directly in Syria and sent on April of the same year many squadrons of aircraft to the air base of Latakia where it bombarded the positions of ISIS. In this context, the Russian president Vladimir Putin

19- Muhammed Kashkoush. The military civilian relations: the seven problems which face the armies after the Arab revolutions. Cairo. International politics review. No. 188 April 2012. P.157

20-. Eathar Anwar Muhammed. The three circles of the Iranian vital domain Review of the University of Karbla. Volume 13. No. 3 2015. P.230. Iraq.

said in the 30th of September "The Russian air strikes in Syria will be limited in scope" (22) and expressed his hope that the Syrian president would be ready to conduct political reform and settlement for the sake of his people. Since that time, the regime of Bashar Al-Assad recovered the control of 65% of the Syrian territories.

During the past years, the war in Syria moved from an internal conflict to quiet and global confrontation between Russia and its allies on one side, and the United States and their partners in the other side. Syria has become the principle field of confrontation between those two super powers, where Russia try to lay the foundations of a multi-polar world and believes that the new international system, which is in the process of formation depends on the result of the war currently taking place on the Syrian territories. Besides Russia tested on these territories new weapons provided to its army within an ambitious program aiming the modernization of its military capacities. (23)

The Syrian crisis may result in reformulating the coalitions at the regional and international levels, if we take in consideration the move away of Turkey from the N.A.T.O. and the return of Russia as a major player in the Middle-East region. International observers believe that the most important Russian interest in Syria is to maintain its military base in Tartus. This base, that was built according to an agreement signed in 1971, is the last maritime position for a Russian fleet in the Mediterranean. In 2006 Russia exempted Syria's debts amounted at (9.8) billion Dollars, to keep, in return, this base operating...

21-Adnan Al-Sayed Hussain. Internationalization of the Syrian Crisis and the difficulties of settlement. Beirut. Center of Arab Unity Studies. no 38. Spring 2013 pp. 4-5.

22-Same reference

23- Same reference

The Russian naval forces carried out military manoeuvres off the Syrian shores in the Mediterranean that lasted from 19th -29th 2013 . They were the first of its kind since the breaking-up of the former soviet union. More than 20 frigates and three submarines participated in those manoeuvres which joined the manoeuvres of the Russian armies stationed in the Black sea, the Baltic sea, and the North sea.

The Russian president Vladimir Putin had decided to establish a Russian military presence in the Mediterranean when he assumed, for the first time, the post of prime minister in 1999. This goal was listed in the Russian military doctrine and the first tangible steps of realizing it were discovered in 2006 by reports indicated that a strategy was conducted to develop the former Russian maritime service stations in Syrian Tartus port where a complete maritime base would be built to reposition the majority of the Russian Black sea maritime fleet.

The Russian responsible in Tartus consider this port as a strategic gate for the Russian navy, not only it will guaranty its access to the Mediterranean but, to another maritime areas also like the Atlantic Ocean (via the strait of Gibraltar), the Red sea, and the Horn of Africa., which means an element of strategic balance facing the American navy in those areas. Historically, Catherine , the tsar of Russia said “ Who owns Syria, owns the middle east, Asia’s gate and the key of the Russian’s house.

CONCLUSION

The involvement of the Russian Federation in Georgia , Ukraine, and Syria as we explained above caused by the conviction of the Russian officials that the geopolitics replaced, after the breaking up of the former Soviet – Union, the ideology. The condemnations of the geopolitics as a tool of the capitalist regime domination, disappeared after the soviet era, then geopolitics was rehabilitated and the reputation of Mackinder, Mahan, and Carl Haushofer improved. According to the new geographical weakness of the Russian Federation, Russia hadn’t any choice but to be *revisionist power* determining secretly or directly to recover its close proximity in Belarus,Ukraine, Moldavia and Caucasia .

If we examine deeply the situation in Georgia, we find that Russia wanted to gain the favor of the Abkhazian people

and their government in order not to let Abkhazia join the N.A.T.O. It is well known that Abkhazia overlooks the Russian border, so it will be the most stubble area for the N.A.T.O. bases. Moreover Russia supports, militarily, politically, and financially the Abkhazian government that wants to join the Russian Federation, thus it puts pressure on Georgia which represents for Russia (the key of Caucasia). It is also, in military terms, a vital corridor for the security of the Russian Federation, a border strip separating Russia, Turkey , Iran and open window overlooking the black sea. if Russia controls entirely Abkhazia. It will get rid of being a land-locked state after the breaking-up of the former soviet-union.

With regard to Ukraine, it has an important and strategic location at a crossroads between Europe and Asia continents and is considered as the ground to underpin the balance of power in Caucasia region that extends north to Russia and west to east Russia characterized as a passage for the gas pipelines towards west Europe countries. Moreover, Ukraine contains the biggest system of gas pipelines of 35.2 kilometers, 120 gas pump stations, and 15 underground repositories of gas. Through Ukraine passed the pipeline of the northern stream that fuel one third of Europe’s gas needs. , and the Russian black sea fleet is stationed in Sevastopol, the Ukrainian city which is located at the top of the region that the scientists call the *land edge for Eurasia* ..

The Ukrainian crisis represented a new challenge for the Russian national security and a real threat to the strategic influence of the Russian Federation in its immediate geographical circle..

Once the Atlantic separation wall extending from Estonia to Turkey is accomplished, there won’t be for Russia but Ukraine and Belarus as two windows on its west European borders. One look to the European map explains the scale of the real threat that affects the Russian Federation. The west progressed by the black sea to Bulgaria and Romania and it joined the N.A.T.O. pact, that means even if the Russian Federation took control of Crimea, it would face subsequently neighboring countries, which are members of the N.A.T.O..

In the north-west of the continent, the west progressed in an unprecedented effort that contained the three Baltic states of the former soviet union : Estonia, Latvia, and

Lithuania including Poland. What Putin wants is to keep Ukraine as a neutral or a buffer state in order not to join the N.A.T.O.

Before concluding with the Syrian crisis, it is worth to say that history doesn't mention that great changes occurred by the political consensus. On the contrary, they were the key of all changes. That is why we say history doesn't recognize but the strongest. Russian Federation didn't interfere in Syria to be defeated. Its presence in this country is the reflection of Evgeny Primakov's saying "Russian Federation can't help but being present in the middle east"

N.A.T.O. detected that Russia was intending to build the third defense dome as the first of its kind in the Middle East after building two others, the first in Kaliningrad which is the Russian geographical separated enclave on the Baltic sea between Lithuania and Poland, the second in Crimea on the black sea.

Russian Federation accorded priority to its geopolitical logic and acted quickly to possess significant barter cards in confronting the United States and the West and their interference in the back garden of Russia. Therefore, the vast military intervention in Syria paved the way to negotiate the situations in Syria with the United States.

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